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NOT PRECEDENTIAL
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
_____________
No. 09-2012
_____________
JONATHAN KNIGHT,
Appellant,
v.
DAVID DRYE, In His Individual and His Official Capacity As Chalfont Borough
Manager; MARILYN BECKER, In Her Individual and In Her Official Capacity as Mayor
Of Chalfont Borough; GARY LUCAS, In His Official Capacity As President Chalfont
Borough Council; CHALFONT BOROUGH COUNCIL, In Their Official Capacities As
Members of Chalfont Borough Council; CHALFONT BOROUGH; CHIEF POLICE
FRANK CAMPBELL, In His Official Capacity As Chief Of Chalfont Borough Police
Department; POLICE BENEVOLENT ASSOCIATION, Chalfont Borough Lodge;
CHALFONT BOROUGH POLICE DEPARTMENT, Chalfont Borough; FRATERNAL
ORDER OF POL LODGE #53

______________
On Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania
(D.C. No. 07-cv-03097)
District Judge: Honorable Eduardo C. Robreno
_______________
Submitted Under Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a)
January 26, 2010
Before: FUENTES, FISHER, Circuit Judges; and KANE, * Chief District Judge.

*

Honorable Yvette Kane, Chief Judge of the United States District Court for the
Middle District of Pennsylvania, sitting by designation.

(Filed: April 14, 2010)
_______________
OPINION OF THE COURT
_______________
KANE, Chief District Judge.
Jonathan Knight appeals from an order of the District Court granting summary
judgment to the Appellees. See Knight v. Drye, No. 07-3097 (E.D. Pa. Mar. 13, 2009).
Knight’s amended complaint asserted thirteen causes of action based on his termination
from his position as a police officer because he allegedly disclosed confidential
information concerning an undercover narcotics investigation. On appeal, Knight
challenges only the dismissal of his claim based on 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for First
Amendment retaliation. We will affirm.
I.
We write exclusively for the parties, who are familiar with the factual context and
legal history of this case. Therefore, we will set forth only those facts necessary to our
analysis.
On February 12, 1999, Knight began his employment as a police officer for
Chalfont Borough. After joining the police force, Knight developed a casual friendship
with Whitney Watson, IV, the manager of a local car wash. In 2005, Watson was under
investigation by the Bensalem Township Police Department for his participation in drug
dealing. In January 2005, Watson contacted Knight. Knight alleges that Watson
2

“complained about harassment by fellow Officer Clifford Horn.” (Appellant’s Br. at 6.)
Knight maintains that after being contacted by Watson, he promptly took the complaint to
Officer Robert Milligan and to Police Chief Frank Campbell. (Id.) At that time, Milligan
and Campbell informed Knight that Watson was under investigation.
On September 23, 2005, after being tipped by an undercover informant that Knight
had given information about the investigation to Watson, the Chalfont Borough Council
placed Knight on a temporary paid leave of absence. On September 27, 2005, Knight was
arrested and charged with obstructing the administration of law or governmental function
and hindering prosecution. That same day, he was suspended by the Chalfont Borough
Council without pay. On October 11, 2005, Knight was terminated from his position as a
police officer.
In June 2005, in the period between Knight’s contact with Watson and his
termination, Knight was involved as a witness of an incident at a local pub. According to
Knight, while he was off duty, he witnessed David Drye, Chalfont Borough manager,
steal beer from behind the bar and distribute it to other customers. An argument arose
between Drye and the pub owner. Knight attempted to break up the fight that ensued.
However, he was not involved in the later official investigation of the altercation.
II.
The District Court had jurisdiction over this matter pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1331.
This Court has jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We review a District Court's
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order granting summary judgment de novo, applying the same standard as the District
Court. Alcoa, Inc. v. United States, 509 F.3d 173, 175 (3d Cir. 2007). Summary
judgment is appropriate only where there is no genuine issue of material fact and the
moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Saldana v. Kmart Corp., 260
F.3d 228, 232 (3d Cir. 2001).
III.
The District Court entered summary judgment for Appellees. On appeal, Knight
claims that there were genuine issues of material fact regarding his First Amendment
retaliation claim that should have precluded summary judgment. Knight contends that he
was fired for engaging in two specific instances of protected conduct. First, Knight cites
his report to Police Chief Campbell and Officer Milligan alleging misconduct by Officer
Horn. Second, Knight cites the potentially criminal conduct by Drye that Knight
witnessed when he was off-duty.1
“To state a First Amendment retaliation claim, a public employee plaintiff must
allege that his activity is protected by the First Amendment, and that the protected activity
was a substantial factor in the alleged retaliatory action.” Gorum v. Sessoms, 561 F.3d
179, 184 (3d Cir. 2009) (citing Hill v. Borough of Kutztown, 455 F.3d 225, 241 (3d Cir.

1

In his appeal, Knight also raises a claim that he was terminated for testifying before a
grand jury, which was empaneled to investigate his own criminal conduct. This claim
was not raised before the District Court and, as a result, is waived on appeal. See Bagot
v. Ashcroft, 398 F.3d 252, 256 (3d Cir. 2005); Brenner v. Local 514, United Bhd. of
Carpenters & Joiners of Am., 927 F.2d 1283, 1298 (3d Cir. 1991).
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2006)). “‘The first factor is a question of law; the second factor is a question of fact.’”
Id. (quoting Hill, 455 F.3d at 241).
A public employee’s statement is protected activity when (1) in making it, the
employee spoke as a citizen, (2) the statement involved a matter of public
concern, and (3) the government employer did not have ‘an adequate
justification for treating the employee differently from any other member of
the general public’ as a result of the statement he made.
Hill, 455 F.3d at 241-42 (quoting Garcetti v. Ceballos, 547 U.S. 410, 418 (2006)).
We find that the District Court was correct in dismissing both of Knight’s First
Amendment claims as insufficient to withstand summary judgment. First, Knight’s
complaint up the chain of command to Officer Milligan and Police Chief Campbell is not
speech protected by the First Amendment. “[W]hen public employees make statements
pursuant to their official duties, the employees are not speaking as citizens for First
Amendment purposes, and the Constitution does not insulate their communications from
employer discipline.” Garcetti, 547 U.S. at 421. Although Knight argues that his report
should be protected by the Third Circuit’s recent pronouncement in Reilly v. City of
Atlantic City, 532 F.3d 216 (3d Cir. 2008), his reliance on that case is misplaced. In
Reilly, we found that the truthful testimony by a police officer in court constituted
“citizen speech” and was therefore precluded from the “official duties” doctrine set forth
in Garcetti. Reilly, 532 F.3d at 231. However, Knight’s out-of-court statements to his
superiors do not fall into this category. Therefore, the District Court was correct in
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finding that Knight failed to establish a First Amendment violation based on his reporting
of any misconduct by Officer Horn.
Second, Knight argues that his observation of the conduct of Manager David Drye
was a motivation for his firing, and that his retaliation claim should therefore have been
allowed to proceed. Again, the District Court properly found that Knight failed to point
to record evidence that he ever reported Drye’s conduct. Absent such a report, the
District Court was correct in finding that Knight could not support a First Amendment
retaliation claim.
We agree with the District Court’s conclusion that no genuine issue of fact
remained. Appellees were therefore entitled to summary judgment on the First
Amendment retaliation claim.
Additionally, Knight argues that the District Court erred by citing grounds for his
firing that were not relied upon by Appellees and by failing to draw factual inferences in
his favor. Essentially, Knight argues that “a jury would be left with questions about the
real reasons Appellee offered for firing” him. (Appellant’s Br. at 28.) However, Knight
misses the point. Whatever the motivations were for his firing, he has failed to establish
that they were the result of the exercise of his First Amendment rights. Therefore, his
First Amendment retaliation claim was properly dismissed.
IV.
For the foregoing reasons, we will affirm the order of the District Court.
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